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1 Keriman1 was a middle-aged woman who worked as the manager of a secularist vakıf
that focused on providing disadvantaged urban youth with access to educational and
health  services.  During  our  2009  interview,  she  told  me  about  some  of  the  recent
changes she had been observing at the Vakıf General Ministry [Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü]
(VGM). Whereas previously the VGM mostly stuck to routine investigations, it recently
begun to show an interest in the activities of private vakıfs and invited managers and
volunteers to various conferences,  workshops and meetings.  Although Keriman had
been receiving invitations for the past  five years,  she had only recently decided to
attend  a  Vakıf Week  Celebration  with  another  volunteer.  From  the  moment  they
entered the conference venue, however, they felt different from the other participants.
There were only a small number of women in attendance and, unlike Keriman and the
other volunteer, most of them were wearing a headscarf. Most of the male participants
also were also dressed in conservative attire and had beards or moustaches. When a
panel on the history of Turkish vakıfs began with a prayer and focused exclusively on
the accomplishments of the Ottoman period, the two women left the conference venue
at once. Keriman explained that this incident was the result of the “post-1980 political
climate” of Turkey and continued: 
For example, the other day a man from the VGM came for his routine inspection.
From his appearance, it was obvious what the political views of this man were… he
had a thin moustache; it was shown in his demeanour. Right before leaving, he said:
“I have never seen such a good, hardworking vakıf, you are just like an Ottoman
vakıf,  you  have  built  one  just  like  those.”  The  man meant  well,  he  said  this  to
celebrate us, but I was barely able to contain myself. 
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2 Many different points emerge from Keriman’s statements: that she was a secularist-
Kemalist,  that she disapproved of what she perceived to be the Islamization of civil
society, and that she felt allegiance to an alternative network of civic organizations. For
her, being likened to an Ottoman vakıf was not a compliment, but an affront. Keriman
was  responding  to  a  specific  historical  conjuncture  in  which  conservative  actors
portray Ottoman vakıfs as a cultural heritage to be resuscitated, revived, and preserved
by  contemporary  civil  society  organizations.  In  contrast,  Keriman did  not  consider
Ottoman vakıfs to be such a model for Turkish civil society. 
3 In this article, I argue that the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) neo-Ottomanist
mode  of  heritage  production  has  consolidated  a  collaborative  model  of  state-civil
society relations in Turkey. After its election in 2002, the JDP has reproduced Turkish
national identity along Ottoman-Islamic lines and within such a conjuncture vakıfs 
have emerged as the key inspiration for the new Islamist political-intellectual elite. The
JDP presents the Ottoman Empire as a Vakıf Civilization and constructs a new discourse
of  national  heritage.  This  new  heritage  discourse  has  not  only  changed  ideas  and
practices about the Ottoman past, but has also played a significant role in depoliticizing
Islamic civil society. 
4 This argument is substantiated by archival, textual, and ethnographic data collected
between August 2009 and July 2010 in Turkey. During this period, I interviewed vakıf 
managers, volunteers, and donors and participated in a number of social and charitable
events organized by these institutions. Although, I situate these conversations against
the  historical  background  of  the  development  of  Turkish  civil  society  and  the
transformation of political Islamism, the analysis primarily focuses on the post-2002
period  in  which  I  argue  that  a  new  understanding  of  Ottoman  “civil  society” has
emerged due to the JDP’s neo-Ottomanist mode of heritage production. 
5 The article will proceed as follows: firstly, drawing on civil society in the Middle East
literature  I  will  highlight  the  significant  role  played  by  heritage  politics  for
understanding the prospects of civil society in countries like Turkey; secondly I will
provide historical information about associations [derneks] and foundations [vakıfs] and
discuss how alternative approaches to Ottoman heritage have shaped the politics of
civil society during the 1990s; finally, I illustrate how the transformation of Islamism
into a neoliberal-conservative political movement has rearticulated notions of Ottoman
heritage in the post-2002 period.  I  illustrate that  the Vakıf  Civilization rhetoric has
emphasized  a  collaborative  state-civil  society  relationship,  thereby  serving  to
depoliticize  the  democratic  potential  of  vakıfs  and derneks.  This  argument  relies  on
empirical  evidence collected in 2009-2010 in the archives of  the VGM, the National
Library of  Turkey and various other publications and newspaper articles  as  well  as
interviews with civil society actors. 
 
I. The Effects of Ottoman-Islamic Heritage on Turkish
Civil Society
6 The  study  of  civil  society  in  the  Middle  East  has  generally  been  divided  between
culturalist and institutionalist explanations. First, often seeking to provide an answer
to the question of why a “democracy deficit”2 exists in the region, scholars have argued
that Islamic religious beliefs, legal systems and institutional structures have prevented
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the emergence of a civil society independent from the state (Gellner 1994; Kuran 2012;
Mardin 1969).  As a  response to these unenthusiastic  claims,  others have traced the
origins of civic life to the Ottoman period, pointing out that vibrant associational life
that was centred around vakıfs, guilds, and Sufi orders, and the diverse social, political,
and  economic  functions  performed  by  civil  society  organizations  (CSOs)  in
contemporary Muslim societies (Ismael and Ismael 1997; Norton 2001; Hoexter 2002;
Achilov  2013).  Despite  disagreeing  on  what  such  a  heritage  entails,  both  of  these
culturalist  frameworks  understand  civil  society  as  historically  fixed  heritage.  In
contrast,  scholars  who  have  considered  the  question  of  civil  society  from  an
institutionalist  framework  of  analysis  argue  that  an  understanding  of  the  real
challenges faced by CSOs in the region is obscured by the concentration on Ottoman /
Islamic heritage. They suggest that the focus should be on the ways in which repressive
states seek to control, co-opt, and constrain political activism and the types of political
strategies that may be available to CSOs within these restrictive political opportunity
structures (Wiktorowicz 2000; Yom 2005). 
7 Rather than treating heritage as a fixed phenomenon, this article investigates the ways
in which heritage discourse is constructed by political elites and the state in order to
redraw the boundaries of permissible civil society activity. The analytical framework of
this study is based on an understanding of national heritage as a socially constructed
phenomenon as  opposed  to  a  fixed-cultural  essence  (Brett  1996;  Mitchell  2001).  As
Stuart Hall (2005: 25) argues, “Heritage … is one of the ways in which the nation slowly
constructs for itself a sort of collective social memory.” This perspective highlights the
key role played by heritage politics in constructions of national identity. 
8 In Turkey as well,  political elites use distinctive articulations of cultural heritage in
order to attain political legitimacy and popular support. Although this distinction has
become less central in the past couple of years, Turkish politics is still largely polarized
between secularist-Kemalist and conservative-Islamist political elites (Göle 1997; Somer
2007). In addition to class-based and religion-related disputes, these two political elites
have  also  disagreed  about  the  cultural-historical  parameters  of  Turkey’s  national
heritage.  Secularist-Kemalists  generally celebrate pre-Ottoman and early Republican
heritage  and  reject  the  significance  of  the  Ottoman  past  (Çolak  2003;  Çetin  2004;
Çağaptay 2002; Özyürek 2006). In contrast, Islamists, embrace the contributions of the
Ottoman heritage and seek to imagine Turkish culture in a way that corresponds to this
heritage discourse (Bartu 2001; Çınar 2005; Çolak 2006; Fisher Onar 2009; Öncü 2007;
Mills 2011; White 2014). 
9 Disagreement over Turkey’s national heritage also shapes the domain of civil society.
For  example,  since  the  early  1990s,  much of  scholarly  concern  has  focused  on  the
“weakness” of civil society in Turkey. Key debates have focused on the types, quality,
and effectiveness of CSOs, investigated the impact of the Europeanization process, and
have  sought  to  uncover  the  nature  of  state-civil  society  relations  and  to  highlight
prospects  for  democratization  (Diez  et  al. 2005;  Kadıoğlu  2005;  Kuzmanovic  2012;
İçduygu  2011;  Işık  2012;  Şimşek  2004;  Turam  2004;  Yılmaz  2005;  Zihnioğlu  2013).
Nevertheless,  the ways in which state-civil  society relations have been governed by
shifting notions of Turkey’s national heritage has not been examined in depth.3 For
example,  secularist-Kemalists  generally  attribute  the  “weakness”  of  Turkish  civil
society to the Ottoman heritage of religious associational life, which they argue was
characterized  by  authoritarian,  repressive,  and  intolerant  tendencies.  In  contrast,
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Islamists claim that the Ottoman heritage of pluralist, tolerant, and multicultural civil
society was destroyed by the authoritarian reforms of the early republican Kemalist
regime.  The  next  section  provides  a  historical  background on  Turkish  civil  society
before moving on to examine how shifting interpretations of Ottoman heritage have
shaped the terrain of civil society in the post-1980 period. 
 
II. A Brief History of “Civil Society” in Turkey: Derneks 
and Vakıfs
10 In general, two different types of organizations are included in studies of Turkish civil
society:  associations  [derneks]  and  religious  endowments  [vakıfs]. Derneks  are  legal
entities that are created by individual members who come together with a common
purpose,  while  vakıfs  tend  to  be  philanthropic  organizations  which  require  the
endowment  of  a  certain  amount  of  money  for  a  specific  social  cause. These
organizations  may  have  secular  or  religious  missions,  engage  in  various  forms  of
political activism or charitable endeavours, and may have pro-democratic or polarizing
tendencies (Bikmen and Meydancıoğlu 2006: 37-39). 
11 Turkish vakıfs and derneks are regulated under different legal-institutional structures
which have a long history predating Republican Turkey, its origins going back to the
late  Ottoman  Empire.  Despite  this  long  history,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  the
meanings  and  practices  of  vakıfs  and  derneks  were  subject  to  change  throughout
modern Turkish history. Thus, whether or not these organizations could be considered
a part of “civil society,” even before the advent of the term, is a controversial topic. For
this reason, as Kuzmanovic argues, in Turkish civil society studies, a distinction is often
made between the pre-1980 and post-1980 era, or the “new history of civil society and a
long history of associational activities” (2012: 11). The following historical background
on these two organizations, therefore, should not be taken as a linear history of civil
society  in  Turkey,  but  rather  should  be  read as  the  historical  context  of  two local
associational forms, which later came to be redefined as CSOs. 
12 Created in 1923, the new Turkish Republic inherited the legal-institutional structure of
vakıfs and derneks from the Ottoman Empire, and proceeded to eradicate the former and
restrict the latter. According to Islamic law, vakıfs are endowments in perpetuity: when
a property (a road, a bridge, a water fountain, a school building) is transformed into a
vakıf, it entails that the owner has given up his / her right to ownership. During the
Ottoman Empire vakıfs performed a variety of functions. Vakıf buildings assisted in the
colonization  and  urbanization  of  newly  conquered  lands;  vakıf-makers  (who  were
usually members of the elite) were able to acquire and retain their property and land;
and these vakıf-complexes were often central to the provision of healthcare, shelter,
and  poor  relief  to  surrounding  communities.4 Despite  the  relative  financial-
administrative independence of these institutions, the emergence of the modern state,
increasing European involvement in Ottoman territories, and financial difficulties led
to their eventual centralization under the Ministry of Evkaf [Evkaf-i Hümayun Nezareti]
created by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826 (Barnes 1986; Çızakca 2000; Özaral 2012). From
1923 onward, the new Turkish state continued with the confiscation of vakıf properties
and lands. A Committee for the Abolishment of Vakıfs was created in 1937 to oversee the
sale and transfer of vakıfs. The Evkaf-i Hümayun Nezareti was transformed into the VGM
and this  ministry was tasked with the management and oversight of  both Ottoman
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vakıfs in addition to those created after the foundation of the Turkish Republic.  The
complete overhaul of the vakıf system was an important part of the Kemalist state led
development plan and the secularization of socio-economic life. The dismantlement of
vakıfs went  hand  in  hand  with  the  ban  on  religious  communities,  Sufi  orders  and
brotherhoods as a result of the Law Concerning the Closing of Religious Convents and
Communities,  1925.  From  the  perspective  of  secular  Turkish  nationalism,  these
religious  associations  were  seen  as  an  impediment  to  modernization  and  were  not
considered  part  of  “civil  society.”  As  a  result  of  the  restrictive  legal-institutional
structure,  only  a  very  limited  number  of  vakıfs  were  created  during  the  early
Republican era (Singer 2011: 564). 
13 In  contrast  to  vakıfs,  derneks have  a  shorter  history  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  As  a
response to the 1908 Young Turk revolution, the Second Constitutional Era began with
the introduction of the 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations [Cemiyetler Kanunu], which
governed civic communities, political parties and workers’ groups (Toprak 1983). The
relative  liberal  atmosphere  of  the  Second  Constitutional  Era,  however,  dissipated
during the nation-state building project,  which did not tolerate political opposition.
The  new  Turkish  state  did  encourage  the  formation  of  a  variety  of  pro-regime
organizations  such as  public  employee associations,  charitable  groups and worker’s
cooperatives.  But  organizations  such  as  the  Philanthropy-Lovers  Association,  the
Children’s Protection Society and the People’s Houses are best considered as “auxiliary
organizations  of  the  party  state”  (Buğra  2008:  147).  Instead  of  being  a  voluntary
manifestation of grassroot activism, the main function of these organizations was the
creation of  an “active society” that  would voluntarily  support  the “the notion of  a
strong state, secularist developmentalism and the modernist project” (Keyman, 2006:
26). Thus, the patriotic associational-philanthropic spirit of these organizations could
hardly be considered as an example of an autonomous “civil society.” 
14 Yet, despite the restrictive political atmosphere of the early Republican era, Turkey
witnessed a significant growth in the number of associations after the transition to a
multiparty  system  in  1946.  Turkish  people  took  advantage  of  the  liberal  political
atmosphere brought about by the 1938 Cemiyetler Kanunu: by 1972 there were 45,000
associations in Turkey, compared to 2,000 in the 1950s (Toksöz 1983: 377). The number
of vakıfs also increased after the introduction of the 1967 Vakıf Law which has enabled
the survival  of  this  institution,  albeit  in a significantly new form (Çızakca 2000:  90;
Zencirci forthcoming). During the 1970s, vakıfs were redefined as private philanthropic
foundations and a total of 600 new vakıfs were created between 1967 and 1980. 5 This
decade was also marked by violent confrontations between extreme left and right wing
movements.  Derneks were especially  involved in left-wing student and labour union
activism.  The  political  violence  of  the  1970s  left  an  enduring  mark  in  the  Turkish
national psyche, and shaped the ways in which political opposition was managed in the
decades that followed this tumultuous era. 
 
III. Neo-Ottomanism and the Remaking of Civil Society
in the post-1980 period 
15 In addition to the liberalization of the economy, a dramatic shift in the perception and
portrayal of the Ottoman Empire occurred after the 1980s. In contrast to the heritage
discourse of secular nationalism which sought to disassociate Turkish national identity
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from Islam as  well  as  the  Ottoman past,  a  new understanding  of  national  identity
referred to as the the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” emerged (Çetinsaya 1999). This new
construct of national identity deployed innovative constructions of Ottoman heritage
towards solving Turkey’s present problems. 
16 One of the key consequences of this new notion of national heritage was the expansion
of vakıf activity. The 1983 Law of Associations (#2908) made it cumbersome to organize
under  the  legal  category  of  derneks,  thereby  making  vakıfs the  preferred  outlet  for
various associational formations. The legal atmosphere was so favourable that between
1981 and 1996, 3021 new vakıfs, engaged in both religious charity and political activity,
were founded (Zevkliler 1996:1440). Influenced by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, vakıfs 
were also perceived and portrayed in a new light. 
17 For example, in a series of articles published in the Türkiye newspaper in 1986, historian
Bayram Kodaman argued that for the last 150 years the attention of the Turkish elite
had been diverted by issues of “Western civilization, democracy, liberalism, socialism
and communism” and claimed that this diversion damaged authentic Turkish culture.
He continued: 
Even Atatürk,  who destroyed everything  left  by  the  Ottomans,  decided  to  keep
vakıfs around.  But  our  elite  often forget  this  historical  fact.  What  is  the reason
behind this silence? This is because a strong vakıf institution feeds the poor. Some
of our intellectuals, however, prefer if there are a lot of hungry people, because
they see hungry people as an instrument for their revolutions.6 
18 This account represents the historical shift concerning perceptions of how Ottoman
heritage  should  influence  Turkey’s  present.  The  author  criticizes  the  Turkish
intelligentsia for not being in tune with the “real” culture of the Turkish nation, and
suggests that the vakıf institution is better suited to address the needs of the Turkish
people,  especially  the  poor,  instead  of  the  empty  promises  of  leftist  and  Kemalist
revolutions.  During  the  same  period,  a  number  of  scholarly  publications  began  to
examine the possible  resuscitation of  Ottoman vakıf  heritage for  governing Turkish
welfare policy (Kozak 1985; Kazıcı 1985). These new intellectuals claimed that reviving
the vakıf institution was the only way to assist  the Turkish poor.  Furthermore,  the
Social  Solidarity  and  Mutual  Assistance  Fund  (commonly  referred  to  as  the
FAKFUKFON) was created in 1986 to provide social  services to those who had been
disenfranchised  by  the  onset  of  economic  liberalization.  With  this  social  fund,  the
Turkish state created 750 new vakıfs and tasked them with identifying and assisting
poor  people  in  local  neighbourhoods. For  example,  a  brochure  published  by  the
governing  Motherland  party  brochure  explained  why  vakıfs  should  deliver  social
services:
Vakıfs  are  the  best  way  to  help  needy  people  without  suffocating  them  in
bureaucratic details. This is revealed by the fact that vakıfs have been accepted as
the most established and permanent institution by the Turkish-Islamic civilization
existing in Anatolia for the last thousand years.7
19 Such remarks capture the beginnings of a new understanding about vakıfs. In contrast
to Kemalist articulations which sought to portray vakıfs as part of a pre-Islamic Turkish
heritage, the Ottomanist articulations that emerged in the post-1980 period sought to
underscore  the  religious  aspects  of  the  vakıf  institution.  Although,  neo-Ottomanist
depictions of vakıf heritage emerged during the 1980s,  the equivalence of vakıfs with
civil society organizations did not occur until later. 
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20 Such a correspondence became intelligible as a result of various political processes that
occurred  in  the  post-1990  era.  First,  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  witnessed  the
emergence of a variety of political groups and social movements that questioned the
premise of  Kemalist  secular  nationalism and voiced their  demands for  cultural  and
political  recognition.  The  Islamist  movement,  the  secularist  backlash,  Kurdish
separatism, Alevi revival, and the women’s movement all ignited an “identity crisis”
concerning  the  parameters  of  the  Kemalist  notion  of  Turkish  cultural  heritage
(Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997). The emphasis on a homogenous ethnic identity as well as
the confluence of modernization with Westernization and secularization came under
attack. As a result, many politically motivated derneks and vakıfs were formed in order
to criticize Turkey’s state-centric political structure (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223). 
21 Thus, the concept of “civil society” entered into the Turkish political lexicon amidst
what  appeared  to  be  a  moment  of  associational  revolution  marked  by  the
“autonomization of civil societal elements from the grip of the centre” (Göle 1994: 213).
During the mid-1990s, a series of conferences were organized by both state and non-
state organizations with the purpose of discussing the problems and prospects of civil
society in Turkey. These conferences were largely organized in response to the 1995
democratization package, which, among other things, promised to create a more liberal
environment for associational activity (Kadıoğlu 2005:30). These spaces of intellectual
exchange provided a platform for raising new questions, such as which organizations
could be regarded as civil society organizations; the nature of the proper relationship
between civil society organizations and the state and the conditions under which CSOs
could best contribute to democratization. For example, one of the pressing concerns
was  how  to  translate  the  concept  of  civil  society.  This  issue  was  discussed  in  a
conference which brought together representatives from various derneks and vakıfs as:
All  international  organizations,  including  the  United  Nations,  see  voluntary
organizations as institutions created by people who want to play a role in society
outside  of  political  power  and  state  authority.  This  desire  to  voluntarily  do
something, without any pressure or force, is why derneks and vakıfs are considered
as  “voluntary  organizations.” To  call  these  “non-governmental  organizations,”
however, gives these organizations an anti-systemic meaning, thereby creating a
difficulty in our language and customs. As a result of this confusion, universities,
municipalities,  and  business  organizations  have  even  begun  to  claim  that  they
should also be categorized as non-governmental organizations.8 
22 This  excerpt,  like  many  of  the  other  discussions  that  had  taken  place  during  the
mid-1990s, encapsulates a central problem of the time. During this era, intellectuals,
politicians,  civil society  practitioners,  and  activists  were  trying  to  create  local
knowledge about civil society by reflecting on Western political writings on the subject,
and discussing its applicability to the Turkish context. As one scholar and Member of
Parliament put it: “Turkish intellectuals are in search of civil society… separately and
all together they are trying to find civil society and are expecting something from it”
(Karataş 1997: 9). This “search” for civil society meant that local organizational forms,
such as derneks and vakıfs came to be seen in a new light. 
23 For example, in 1995, organizers of a conference on civil society invited Yakup Yıldırım,
a branch manager from the VGM to give information on the status of vakıfs. After he
concluded his  speech,  one  of  the  members  of  the  audience  confronted  him with  a
question: 
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I  am a bit  hesitant  to accept  that  vakıfs are  voluntary organizations.  Vakıfs had
emerged as philanthropic institutions and lack a scientific,  modern institutional
structure. Especially in the Ottoman era, they arouse out of a religious pity towards
the needy, … in the last years, when I see that many vakıfs are created within state
institutions, and that others are created for religious reasons, I hesitate to even call
them civil society organizations. What do you think?9 
24 In response to this query, he said: “many vakıfs today are created by people outside the
state” and that these vakıfs have a variety of social, political and educational purposes,
and for this reason, he further continued, that “we need to keep the social solidarity
and mutual assistance vakıfs outside of the voluntary sector because they were created
by law and are tied to the state.”10 This incident demonstrates the emergence of a new
perception in which vakıfs were expected to have a certain kind of autonomy even if
they were to be considered part of the voluntary sector.  Imagining vakıfs in such a
manner, however, posed a problem because neither autonomy nor civic engagement
had ever been the distinguishing trait of the institution. Yet, the new rearticulation of
Ottoman heritage enabled the representation of  vakıfs as  civil  society organizations
with democratic potential. For example, cabinet minister, Ahmet Cemil Tunç (who later
became a key political figure in the JDP) explained in the introduction to the 1997 Vakıf
Journal that: 
Of  course a  society  which is  used to  voluntary participation and tolerance as  a
result of the influence of vakıfs would have a political model system based upon a
multiplicity  of  voices,  plurality  and  participation.  For  this  reason,  a  culture  in
which the vakıf institution is developed is also one where democratic apprehensions
are stronger (Tunç 1997).
25 This was one of the first times in the history of Turkey that vakıfs were discussed as
civil society organizations that were potentially able to contribute to democratization.
However,  not  everyone  shared  the  celebration  of  vakıfs as  CSOs  with  democratic
potential, indeed such a depiction of Ottoman civil society was a highly contested issue.
26 During the mid-1990s, many civic, associational and charitable organizations emerged
as part of the Islamist movement. These organizations sought to confront, criticize, and
challenge the Turkish state as well as other pro-establishment political circles. Since
associational activity took shape in reaction to specific state policies, many of these
organizations combined a moralistic stance and the overall  endeavour to Islamizing
Turkish society with an anti-state, anti-establishment rhetoric (Kadıoğlu 2005). Some of
these organizations focused on charitable activities whereas others were engaged in
raising awareness, for example, of a woman’s right to wear a headscarf in the public
sphere.  Although  many  of  these  organizations  had  indirect  political  ties  with  the
Islamist  Welfare  party,  they  still  imagined  themselves  to  be  outside  of  “political
society.”  More  importantly,  Islamists  used  this  image  of  an  Islamic  “civil  society”
against the authoritarian Kemalist state to elicit support (Navaro-Yashin 1998). As a
result, many of these vakıfs and derneks came to be seen as contributing to the rise of
political Islam and became a key site of contestation between the secularists and the
Islamists. During this period, secularists also formed voluntary associations that sought
to revitalize the Republican heritage of civil society. Although pro-establishment actors
sometimes used the legal-institutional structure of vakıfs, they rejected the idea that
Ottoman-Islamic heritage could contribute to democratization. Instead, they claimed
that  secularist  “civil  society”  organizations  were  the  true  representatives  of  the
Turkish people (Özyürek 2006).
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27 Therefore,  the  1990s  were  marked  by  three  political  tensions  surrounding  vakıfs.
Firstly, many secularists perceived vakıfs as a sign of the Islamization of society. These
actors feared that vakıfs were secretly working to turn Turkey into an Islamic theocracy
(Zevkliler 1996: 1443). Secondly, there was increasing debate concerned with whether
or not religious associations and communities, which were usually tied to a vakıf could
be considered a part of “civil society.” Secularists argued against such a categorization,
whereas Islamists began to endorse such terminology. Thirdly, secularists associated
vakıfs with clientelist networks of patronage and vote buying. Consequently, vakıfs were
signalled out as one of the agents of Islamization in Turkey during the 28 February
process in 1997, in which the Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan was forced to
resign  and  his  coalition  government  removed  from  power.  During  this  period,  the
military obtained a significant amount of support from secularist Kemalist civil society
organizations such as the Atatürkist Thought Association, The Association to Support
Contemporary Life, Contemporary Education Foundation, as well as a number of others.
In contrast, many conservative-Islamist vakıfs and associations were faced with political
suppression.  In  order  to  distance itself  from Islamist  “civil  society,”  the VGM even
published a special brochure in 1998 explaining that the Ministry did not have control
over the day-to-day political and charitable activities of vakıfs.11 
28 Consequently,  many  Islamist  actors,  politicians  and  intellectuals  understood  the  28
February  Process  to  be  yet  another  occurrence  of  the  military-state  establishment
crashing down on Turkish  “civil  society.”  In contrast  to  the  heritage  actors  of  the
mid-1980s, who had emphasized the philanthropic and charitable functions of vakıfs, in
the  immediate  post-1997  period,  the  Ottoman heritage  of  civil  society  began to  be
imagined  as  a  politically  active  force  capable  of  confronting,  criticizing,  and
challenging state power. Although some politicians and intellectuals were careful not
to uncritically apply the term civil society to the Ottoman Empire, many understood
contemporary Islamist derneks and vakıfs  to be the latest phase in the long struggle
against the secularist state (Çaha and Karaman 2004; Karaman and Aras 2000). 
29 For example, Abdullah Gül (1997: 14), who would later become the president of Turkey
between 2007  and  2014,  discussed  the  impact  of  the  1997  postmodern  coup as  yet
another instance in which the elite had oppressed the Turkish people and all of their
“civil  activities.”  Further,  such  a  representation  of  the  28  February  process  as  a
confrontation between a secular state and an Islamic civil society was often discussed
by  conservative  intellectuals  with  reference  to  the  richness  of  civil  society  in  the
Ottoman  Empire.  Omer  Çaha  suggested  that  the  Turkish  “intellectual  bureaucratic
elite” had destroyed the Ottoman fabric  of  civil  society (1997:  36).  Sabahattin Zaim
argued that: “Voluntary formations were extremely developed in the Ottoman Empire
and other Islamic societies” (1997: 297). In a similar vein, Ali Bulaç posited that Turkish
civil society had been historically weakened as a result of the abandonment of Islamic
and Ottoman principles in social life, and declared that these civil movements would
continue to face the authoritarian state with their political and cultural demands in the
future (1997: 247-250). 
30 Such accounts of the 28 February process sought to present civil society as a sphere of
collective action and a force for democratization. This Islamist claim (which, it must be
noted,  did  not  necessarily  correspond to  on-the-ground political  realities)  expected
derneks and vakıfs to criticize, challenge, and confront state power. However, such a
politically active notion of  civil  society was replaced by a depoliticized formulation
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after  the  JDP  came to  power  in  2002.  Henceforth,  it  was  argued  that  the  Ottoman
heritage  of  civil  society  was  one  that  relied  on  a  collaborative  state-civil  society
relationship. 
 
IV. From Confrontation to Collaboration:
Reconstructing the Ottoman Heritage of Civil Society
31 The JDP reproduced Ottoman heritage in such a fashion for a number of reasons. After
the 1997 post-modern coup, a moderate-reformist wing led by the JDP adopted a less
confrontational  stance  vis-à-vis  the  Turkish  military  and  the  secular  state
establishment (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Çınar 2003). As a result of this moderation, the JDP
embraced a pro-globalization and pro-European outlook. After its election in 2002, the
party  blended  Islamic  social  values  with  neoliberal  economic  principles,  thereby
embracing a market-oriented political ideology (Tuğal 2009). One of the domains where
the blending of neoliberalism and Islamism occurred was the domain of welfare policy.
In  contrast  to  the  previously  existing  developmentalist  welfare  regime,  the  JDP
diminished the scope of social benefits for public workers, and instead developed a new
welfare regime focused on providing social assistance to the Turkish poor (Buğra 2008;
Özbek  2006).  In  addition,  the  JDP  had  to  sustain  its  legitimacy  while  remaining  in
power. To achieve this, the party had to expand its electoral base to various sectors in
Turkish society. Among other things, such a broadened political platform required an
appeal to, an engagement with –and at times the co-option of– different segments of
the  Islamist  movement.  The  political  activism of  Islamic  civil  society  organizations
(some of which had closer political ties to Islamist political networks other than the
JDP) were repurposed and rechanneled into the area of social service provision (Eder
2010;  Morvaridi  2013).  Transformation  of  Islamism  altered  perceptions  of  Ottoman
heritage and state-civil society relations. In contrast to the depiction of the Ottoman
heritage  of  civil  society  as  a  deeply  political  and  therefore  an  anti-statist,  anti-
establishment force, after the 2000s, the same heritage was (re)articulated by Islamists
in a state-supportive and depoliticized fashion. 
32 Initially, this novel understanding of Ottoman civil society was produced in a series of
conferences  organized  in  2003  by  state  institutions  such  as  the  VGM,  the  Social
Solidarity and Mutual Assistance General Ministry and pro-government Islamic CSOs
such as  the Light House [Deniz  Feneri]  organization.  These conferences included the
Vakıf Civilization  Symposium  (Ankara,  12—13  May  2003),  the  International  Vakıf
Symposium Conference (Ankara, 15—17 December 2003), and the Poverty Symposium
(Istanbul,  31  May—1  June  2003),  which  created  a  platform  for  Islamic-conservative
scholars,  politicians,  and  activists  to  discuss,  and  in  the  process  to  reimagine,  an
Ottoman heritage of poverty alleviation, social justice, and state-civil society relations.
In 2006, the Turkish government declared it to be the national Vakıf Civilization Year
and  yet  another  series  of  conferences  were  organized. The  papers  and  speeches
delivered at these conferences sought to revive the Ottoman tradition of civil society,
and  as  such  operated  as  a  key  mechanism  for  the  production,  negotiation,  and
dissemination of ideas about cultural heritage. For example, the then Deputy Prime
Minister, Mehmet Ali Şahin explained during the 2003 Vakıf Symposium: “….we are not
going  to  just  talk  about  vakıfs…but  we  are  also  going  to  discuss  the  possible
reconfiguration  of  these  institutions.”12 During  the  “Reconstruction  of  vakıfs” 
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symposium panel, Mehmet Akif Aydın, a law professor, stated: “The Turkish state and
bureaucracy has always approached civil institutions such as the vakıf with suspicion.
Throughout  our  history,  legislation  introduced  about  vakıfs and  derneks have  been
shaped by the state’s insecurity about associational activity,  but it  is  time for us to
return to the principles of the Ottoman past.”13 Later, during the Vakıf Civilization Year
symposium of 2006, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after discussing why the
“revitalization of the vakıf” had been a key focus of the JDP government, said: “All we
wanted was to make sure that our Ottoman vakıf heritage will continue to illuminate
Turkey’s future with compassion.”14
33 The discourse of reviving the Ottoman heritage of vakıfs enabled the JDP to introduce
two key legal-institutional changes concerning the political and philanthropic activities
of derneks and vakıfs. First, the JDP’s initial years in office were shaped by Turkey’s bid
to become a member of the European Union and to change policies in support of such
membership.  In  the early  2000s,  various  political  reform packages  were adopted in
order to comply with EU regulations and conditions (Müftüler Baç 2005). Freedom of
expression and associational life were identified —amongst others— as vital areas in
need  of  reform  and,  as  a  result,  a  series  of  constitutional  changes  and  legal-
administrative  reforms  were  introduced  in  order  to  liberalize  dernek activity.  In a
conference organized to discuss the future of derneks and vakıfs, Murat Sungur, the
Turkish ministry of EU affairs explained the importance of embarking on a new era in
state-civil society relationships with the following words: 
A country’s level of development is currently judged by modern criteria such as its
respect  for  human  rights,  level  of  participatory  democracy  and  extent  of  good
governance. A state’s capacity and willingness to be in dialogue with civil society is
key to the realization of these principles. (Uzunoğlu 2005:17) 
34 The JDP introduced a series of legal reforms concerning vakıfs and derneks during this
critical  juncture  in  order  to  harmonize  Turkish  civil  society  with  its  European
counterparts. These reforms include the 2004 Law of Associations and the 2008 Law of
Vakıfs  which aimed to  allow a  greater  degree  of  independence to  Turkish  CSOs.  In
addition to these ongoing attempts at reconfiguring civil society, the JDP also initiated
a  comprehensive  reform  of  the  Turkish  welfare  regime,  making  social  assistance
distribution a key mechanism. Social solidarity and assistance derneks and vakıfs were
tasked with delivering social services to the poor. A concerted effort to streamline the
financial and administrative procedures and social assistance distribution mechanisms
of  these  organizations  emerged.  The  number  of  state-related  social  solidarity  and
assistance vakıfs increased to 975 and their scope of activity was expanded.15 In addition,
the  JDP  encouraged  members  of  the  Islamist  network  to  legalize  their  charitable
activities in the form of private social solidarity and assistance derneks. These private
derneks were expected to fulfil similar welfare responsibilities as state vakıfs despite the
fact that they were treated as autonomous CSOs. 
35 In short, both EU-related and welfare-related reforms contributed to the blurring of the
distinction  between  vakıfs and  derneks,  thereby  contributing  to  their  “NGOization”
(Alvarez  1999;  Kamat  2004;  Choudry  and  Kapoor  2013).  More  importantly,  the
reconfiguration of the political  and philanthropic terrain of  vakıfs and derneks were
supported,  managed  and  controlled  by  JDP’s  heritage  discourse  of  Ottoman  civil
society. In this new mode of heritage production, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly
portrayed as one in which civil society organizations, namely vakıfs, collaborated with
the state.
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36 From this perspective, it  was argued that vakıfs formed a part of the Ottoman state
while  at  the  same  time  remaining  distinct  from  it.  These  contradictory  ideas
concerning the ideal state-civil society relationship were expressed in various writings
about the topic and were also articulated by interviewees during my fieldwork. Some
actors emphasized the inherent autonomy of vakıfs vis-à-vis the state. For example, in
his opening speech for the 2006 Vakıf Week Celebrations, Yusuf Bayezit declared that:
“There is locality in the situation of vakıfs. This is a point that is mostly forgotten. Vakıf
is a form of local administration. But it is an enterprise unrelated with the state or
public governance.”16 Other actors that I  met during my fieldwork were ambiguous
about the question of autonomy. For example, Murat, the manager of a branch of the Is
Anybody There? Social  Solidarity and Assistance dernek [Kimse Yok Mu Dayanışma ve
Yardımlaşma derneği] explained:
Some people criticize us; they think we are only giving out hand-outs. But when
you look at the developed countries of the North, what does the state do? It even
leaves milk at its citizens’ doorsteps. Like any welfare state should do. This is what
we are doing here, when we distribute social assistance, we are fulfilling the duties
of a welfare state. 
37 This manager, like many others, believed that the distribution of social assistance by
(government-friendly) civil society organizations was a manifestation of the “welfare
state,” or an example of the state fulfilling its welfare responsibilities. Other actors also
expressed ambiguity concerning the distinction between state and civil society as well.
One female university student who volunteered at the main office of the Light House
dernek explained that she was here to assist the state, but added: “It would of course be
better if the state could reach all the poor, but since it cannot, we are here to serve the
state and the poor.” In these and similar accounts, “civil society” was argued to be in
the  service  of  the  state.  Although  civil  society  organizations  were  financially  and
administratively independent, they were still expected to cooperate with the state. 
38 Interestingly, even some of the state social solidarity and assistance vakıfs imagined
themselves to be part of civil society. Cetin, an enthusiastic manager of a state vakıf in
Ankara, for example, claimed that: “We might be public employees, yes, our salary is
paid by the state, but other than that, what we do here is all the things that a civil
society organization does. That’s why what I tell my workers here is that they need to
think of themselves as workers of a civil society organization even if we appear to be
serving  the  state.”  Although many of  the  workers  at  this  state  vakıf did  not  share
Çetin’s enthusiasm, still some of them agreed that what they did (distributing social
assistance) was largely performing the function of a civil society organization. 
39 In sum, under the JDP’s discourse of Ottoman heritage, civil society came to be seen as a
distinct sector which supports the state. Such a heritage discourse claimed that state-
civil  society  relations  should be  based  on  a  model  of  partnership  to  deliver  social
services. Through a telling of the story of the Ottoman past in a selective way, the JDP
was able to orient the charitable and political dynamism of Islamic civil society towards
embracing a collaborative relationship with the state. 
 
Conclusion 
40 While culturalist and institutionalist approaches towards civil society may be able to
partially explain the depoliticization of civil society in Turkey, this article has shown
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that the mobilization and rearticulation of heritage is crucial for understanding this
particular outcome. Focusing on heritage-as-essence does not help us to recognize the
ways in which shifting articulations of Ottoman heritage have shaped approaches to
contemporary issues, such as civil society. Moreover, understanding Ottoman heritage
as a tangible fixed essence results in an overemphasis on certain political traditions
and ideas at the expense of others. 
41 The question here is not whether a certain Ottoman “civil society” thus portrayed can
be regarded as a truthful representation of the past. There definitely existed a variety
of religious, secular, and political communities, institutions, groups and establishments
that comprised the heart of social life in the Ottoman Empire. At different historical
junctures,  specific segments of Ottoman “civil  society” likely developed a variety of
relationships with the imperial authorities ranging from conflict to accommodation,
and  from  opposition  to  adjustment.  But  the  complexity  of  interactions  between
Ottoman society and polity cannot be understood from the perspective of a modern
dichotomy  such  as  state  versus  civil  society.  Further,  to  mark  these  complex
connections  and  relationships  as  mere  examples  of  “collaboration”  is  not  only  a
simplistic but also a reductionist view of history. Yet, JDP’s articulation about Ottoman
associational  heritage  downplayed  this  complexity  by  manufacturing  a  selective
version of the imperial past, which led to the partial depoliticization of Turkish civil
society. 
42 In this respect, the JDP’s model of heritage does not diverge from other manifestations
of  heritage  politics  which  narrate  the  past  according  to  the  political  needs  of  the
present. As Bendix argues, “segments of culture acquire cultural heritage status once
particular value is assigned to them.” (Bendix 2009: 258) In the case of Turkey, it was
the Islamists who argued that Ottoman “civil society” was a constitutive element of
national cultural heritage. During the 1990s, such a mode of heritagisation portrayed
Islamic  civil  society  as  the  true  representative  of  the  Turkish  people,  and  the
enthusiastic  willingness  of  the movement to  defend the rights  and interests  of  the
populace allowed this political movement to claim legitimacy vis-à-vis the secularist-
military establishment. However, once the JDP assumed office, the Ottoman heritage of
state-civil  society  relations  was  increasingly  portrayed  as  one  of  collaboration  and
partnership. Such a shift in the representation of Ottoman heritage, in turn, reshaped
the terrain of politically permissible activity for CSOs in Turkey. 
43 Various Islamic, secular and leftist CSOs have responded differently to these changes.
On the one hand, ongoing processes of political liberalization which has opened up the
field for associational and charitable activity and allowed new kinds of political and
humanitarian organizations  (such as  MAZLUMDER and İHH17)  to  gain  domestic  and
transnational  influence.  On  the  other  hand,  many  CSOs  have  also  suffered  from
emergent heritage ideas which demand, if not dictate, a collaborative, compliant and
perhaps even a complicit model of civil society. This new mode of heritagisation has
been especially restrictive for CSOs who seek to represent the interests of marginalized,
oppressed  and  discriminated  groups  such  as  women,  Alevi’s,  LGBT  groups  and  the
Kurds. 
44 One of the areas where the restrictive vision of JDP’s Ottoman heritage discourse can be
observed is the 2013 Gezi Park events during which a diverse group of activists and
ordinary people occupied a small park in Istanbul in order to protest the government’s
plan to demolish the park and replace it with a replica of an Ottoman-era barracks
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building  combined  a  shopping  mall  and  apartment  complex.18 The  Turkish  state’s
oppression  of  this  social  movement  illustrates  that  Ottoman  heritage  discourse  is
currently deployed in an anti-democratic, oppressive and polarizing manner perhaps
much to the dismay of some Islamist groups. This situation may not only be the result
of  the  aberrant  use  of  state  power  by  the  JDP,  but  instead  the  consolidation  of  a
particular  view  of  state-civil  society  relations  informed  by  the  Ottoman  heritage
discourse. Whether a new articulation of Ottoman heritage —one that is tolerant of
opposition and conducive to a democratic civil society— will flourish, remains to be
seen. 
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  examines  the  impact  of  JDP’s  (Justice  and  Development  Party)  neo-Ottomanist
heritage  politics  upon  state-civil  society  relations  in  Turkey.  Instead  of  treating  Ottoman
heritage as a fixed essence, this essay illustrates how shifting interpretations of the Ottoman past
serve to construct alternative understandings of  civil  society.  Although during the 1990s the
Islamist movement largely depicted Ottoman “civil society” as a democratic force, I argue that
this earlier understanding has been abandoned in favour of a depoliticized notion of state-civil
society relations after JDP come to power in 2002. The ongoing selective portrayal of Ottoman
heritage represents religious endowments [vakıfs] as state-supportive civil society organizations.
Consequently, many contemporary civil society organizations are expected to conform to these
newly conceived ideas about Ottoman heritage. Most importantly,  this new mode of heritage
production emphasizes a collaborative model of state-civil society relations instead of one that
tolerates political opposition. 
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